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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78A-3-102(3)O).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

U.S. Constitution First Amendment
Urban Mass Transit Act 49 U.S.C. 5333
The Public Transit District Act l 7B-2a-813
The National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C. 152 (1935)
The Utah Labor Relations Act 34-20-2
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE: Did the Trial Court rule correctly that Rail Operations Supervisors

had the right to organize and bargain collectively?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When the legal concept is easily defined the

standard of review is correctness. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, 'i!,I 23-24, 144
P.3d 1096
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: The issue was subject to motions and

rulings. (00159-171)(00277-295)(00707-982)(01008-1017).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case, Course ofProceedings and Disposition Below:

Plaintiff Teamster Local 222 (Union) filed a complaint on April 25,
2014 seeking to be designated as the bargaining representative for the Rail
Operations Supervisors employed by Defendant Utah Transit Authority
(UTA). On October 13, 2015, the District Court issued a ruling and order on
the Union's Motion for Summary Judgment determining that UTA's rail
operations supervisors are "employees" as currently used in Utah state labor
relations. The Court also ordered that the Court would determine whether
the Union enjoyed a majority status among the employees through a card
check method. The Court conducted a card check and determined that the
Union did not have the majority support of the employees and issued a final
order on October 28, 2015. The Union filed a Motion for Relief Under Rule
60(b). The Court granted the Union's Motion and ordered an election to be
held. An election was held on September 12-13, 2016 which the Union lost.
A Final Judgment was entered on October 27, 2016. On November 22, 2016
UTA filed a Motion for a new Trial. The Court denied UTA's Motion on
February 9, 2017. UTA filed a Notice of Appeal on March 10, 2017.
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Statement ofFacts: Teamsters Local 222 is a labor organization

representing employees in industry affecting commerce, as defined in
Sections 501(1) and (3) and 2(5) of the L.M.R.A., 29 U.S.C., Section 142(1)
and (3) and 152(50), and within the meaning of Section 301 thereof, 29
U.S.C., Section 185. (00001 and 00026) The Utah Transit Authority (UTA)
is a Public Transit District organized under§ 17B-2a-801 et seq. U.C.A.
(00002 and 00026). UTA is a recipient of federal funding under the Urban
Mass Transportation Act (UMTA). (00003 and 00027). UTA was created
through the acquisition of private transit companies using funds obtained
under the UMTA. (00003 and 00027) In 2013, there were approximately 38
to 41 Rail Operations Supervisors employed by UTA in its Trax division at
any given time. (00004 and 00027) In January of 2014, UTA ceased paying
the Rail Operations Supervisors on a salary basis and instead made them
hourly employees. (00004 and 00027)
On January 16, 2014, the Union was contacted by Rail Operations
Supervisors employed by UTA. The UTA employees requested assistance
from the Union in organizing and bargaining collectively. On February 1,
2014, Spencer Hogue, Secretary Treasurer of the Union, met with several
Rail Operations Supervisors employed by UTA. At that meeting, the Union
3
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obtained authorization cards from the Rail Operations Supervisors in
attendance. Subsequently, the Union was able to get additional cards for a
total of 23. These cards authorized the Union to be the bargaining agent for
the employees. (00174) On February 1, 2014, the Union sent a letter to UTA
informing them that the Union was conducting an organizing effort among
the Rail Operations Supervisors. (00174) On February 7, 2014, UTA sent the
Union a letter recognizing the employees' right to organize and bargain
collectively under §17B-2a-813. (00174 and 00179) On February 10, 2014,
the Union sent a letter to UTA requesting recognition of the Union as the
bargaining representative of the Rail Operations Supervisors. In that letter,
the Union informed UTA that it had obtained authorization cards from a
majority of the Rail Operations Supervisors. the Union offered to have a card
check done by a third party to prove that the Union had obtained a majority
of support from the employees. (00175 and 00181) A card check involves a
neutral third party comparing the names and signatures on the cards obtained
by the Union against the payroll records of the Company to ascertain whether
the Union has in fact obtained the authorization of a majority of the members
in the requested bargaining unit. The parties use a third party so that the
employees signing the· authorization cards can remain anonymous to the
4
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Company. (00175) On February 24, 2014, UTA sent a response letter.
Without explanation, UTA rejected the proposed bargaining unit. UTA also
rejected the card check proposed by Teamsters Local 222. Instead, UTA
demanded that the Union file a petition for an election. (00175 and 00183).
On March 6, 2014, the Union sent another letter requesting recognition. The
letter explained the Unions position on the bargaining unit. The letter also
provided a legal basis for the use of a card check for determining majority
status. (00176 and 00185-87) On March 17, 2014, UTA responded denying
that the Rail Operations Supervisors had a right to organize. UTA also stated
that they would only bargain with a Union that was certified through an
election. (00189-90) There is no agency or entity authorized to conduct an
election under state or federal law. There are no procedures for conducting
an election under state or federal law. (00176)
On April 25, 2014, the Union filed a complaint with the Court
compelling UTA to bargain with the Union regarding the wages, salaries,
hours, working conditions, and welfare, pension, and retirement of the
bargaining unit. (00001-00020) On August 11, 2015 the Union filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment. (00156-00237) The Union On October 13,
2015, the District Court issued a ruling and order on the Union's Motion for
5
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Summary Judgment determining that UTA's rail operations supervisors are
"employees" as currently used in Utah state labor relations. The Court also
ordered that the Court would determine whether the Union enjoyed a
majority status among the employees through a card check meth9d. (00277295) The Court ordered the Union to provide the Union Authorization
Cards and UTA was to provide the employee list to check the cards against.
(00294). The Court conducted a card check and determined that the Union
did not have the majority support of the employees and issued a final order
on October 28, 2015. (00301-303) The Union filed a Motion for Relief
Under Rule 60(b ). (00304-312) Although the Court ordered the Union to
provide the cards and UTA to provide the employee list, the Union learned
that UTA had also submitted a Petition from employees requesting that their
authorization be withdrawn. The Union asserted that the Petition submitted
by UTA was an unfair labor practice in that it was illegal polling of
employees. (00309-311) The Court granted the Union's Motion. (00434443) The Court determined that UTA's submission of the Petition without
prior notice to the Union denied the Union the ability to challenge the
legality of the submission of the Petition. (00436-437) An election was
held on September 12-13, 2016 which the Union lost. (00698) A Final
6
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Judgment was entered on October 27, 2016. (00697-700) On November 22,
2016 UTA filed a Motion for a new Trial. (00707-982) The Court denied
UTA's Motion on February 9, 2017. (1008-1017) UTA filed a Notice of
Appeal on March 10, 2017. (1018-1020)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The District Court determination that UTA Rail Operations
Supervisors have the right to organize and bargain under Utah Labor Law
was correct. The Union lost the election in this matter. The Union's loss
render the relief requested by UTA as moot. There is no current controversy
between the parties which the Court can resolve which would impact the
remedy of the parties. The District Court properly ruled that Rail Operations
Supervisors rights are determined under state law not federal law. The
District Court then properly ruled that Utah state law, as currently written,
permits the Rail Operations Supervisors to organize and bargain collectively.
The District Court was correct in that any change in the law should come
from the legislature, not the court. The Court should reject UTA's attempt
to revise state legislation through federal legislative history.

7
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO RULE ON THIS
CASE AS MOOT

The Union sought to be designated as the bargaining agent for the Rail
Operations Supervisors. Al). election was held among the Rail Operations
Supervisors on September 14, 2016. The Union lost the election 19 to 25.
Based on the election, the Trial Court declined to certify the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the Rail Operations Supervisors.
UTA was not ordered to bargain with the Union over terms and conditions
of the Rail Operations Supervisors. The Union's loss of the election
terminated the controversy between the parties. Appellate Courts "will not
adjudicate issues when the underlying case is moot. A case is deemed moot
· when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants."
Trustees o{Eighth Dist. Elec. Pension Fund v. Westland Consh"., Inc., 2013

UT App 273,, 2, 316 P.3d 992 quoting State v. Lane. 2009 UT 35,, 18,
212 P.3d 529.
There is no current organizing campaign with the Rail Operations
Supervisors. UTA is requesting advisory opinions for potential future
controversies. This Court has rejected such invitations.
8
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Our cases have long endorsed this position. One of our earliest
explications of justiciabjlity noted that "[ e]ven courts of general
jurisdiction have no power to decide abstract questions or to
render declaratory judgments, in the absence of an actual
controversy directly involving rights." We have since reiterated
that when a court "ascertain [s] that there is no jurisdiction in
the court because of the absence of a justiciable .controversy,
then the court can go no further, and its immediate duty is to
dismiss the action." Baird v. State. 574 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah
1978) Thus, we have unequivocally declared that "courts are
not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering
advisory opinions. Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of
Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, 'if 18,289 P.3d 582.
(footnotes omitted).
This Court lacks the ability to order a remedy that will have any impact on
the parties. The UTA's interest in the current case is theoretical. A decision
favorable to UTA's theoretical interest would reopen a case that is now
resolved for no purpose. The Union asserted that Rail Operations
Supervisors had the right to organize. The Union proceeded on two theories.
First, under Utah Labor Law, supervisors had the right to organize.

Ir the

first theory failed, the Union asserted that Rail Operations Supervisors were
not supervisors within the confines oflabor law. (00476)(00990)(01034).
Under the Union's theory that the Rail Operations Supervisors were not
properly classified as supervisors, UTA would have the burden of proving
that the Rail Operations Supervisors were supervisors under labor law.

9
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National Labor Relations Board v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc.,
532 U.S. 706, 711-712 (2001). An adverse ruling in this matter would cause
the parties to further litigate an issue that will not impact the final ruling, that
the Union failed to obtain a majority status. This is the same stance that the
mootness concept was designed to prevent. "The defining feature of a moot
controversy is the lack of capacity for the court to order a remedy that will
have a meaningful impact on the practical positions of the parties. When a
case is moot in this sense, the parties' interest in its resolution is purely
academic." Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 o{Amalgamated Transit Union,
2012 UT 75, ~ 24, 289 P.3d 582. Because a ruling on this issue will have no
practical impact on the parties, other than to extend unnecessary litigation
with no change to the underlying remedies available to the parties, the Court
should decline to rule on this matter.
The Trial Court reversed itself on the card check issue and ordered an
election. That issue is clearly moot and should not be considered at the
appellate level. Because UTA obtained an election, they cannot ask this
Court for a purely advisory decision. Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of

Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ,r 18,289 P.3d 582.

10
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II.

UNDER UTAH LABOR LAW SUPERVISORS HA VE A

RIGHT TO ORGANIZE

1. Rail Operations Supervisors have a Right to Organize Under
State Law
As a recipient of federal funds from the Urban Mass Transit Act, UTA
is subject to the restrictions under Section 13(c) of the Act. Section 13(c) of
the UMTA 1 requires that arrangements be made to secure the preservation of
collective bargaining rights for employees of entities receiving federal
funding under the UMTA. Burke v. Utah_ Transit Authority, 462 F .3d 1253,
1258 (10th Cir.2006). Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285,
Amalgamated Transit Union. 457 U.S. 15, 27-28, 102 S.Ct. 2202, 72

L.Ed.2d 639 (1982). The State of Utah secured the collective bargaining
rights of employees of Public Transit Districts through the enactment of
§ l 7B-2a-813 U.C.A. 2 .(00003)(00027).

1

Codified as 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b)
§17B-2a-813 U.C.A. is the current version. Utah originally enacted §17a2-1001 U.C.A. in 1969 to comply with the requirements of federal law
contained in UMTA. Burke v. Utah Transit Authority. 462 F .3d 1253, 1258
( I 0th Cir.2006).
2
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Although facially, this case involved the interaction of federal and
state law, the determination of the collective bargaining rights of the UTA
employees is a matter of state law. As stated by the Tenth Circuit:
We doubt federal labor doctrine even applies here. The National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not govern this dispute
because state law and a state agency are involved, and accretion
as well as severance are merely procedural tools used by the
National Labor Relations Board to judge whether a bargaining
unit satisfies the standards set forth in NLRA. Burke v. Utah
Transit Authority & Local 382. 462 F.3d 1253, 1260 fn 2 (10th
Cir.2006)
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court in reviewing the legislative history of
the UMTA stated
Congress made it absolutely clear that it did not intend to create
a body of federal law applicable to labor relations between local
governmental entities and transit workers. Section 13(c) would
not supersede state law, it would leave intact the exclusion of
local government employers from the National Labor Relations
Act, and state courts would retain jurisdiction to determine the
application of state policy to local government transit labor
relations. Jackson Transit Authority v. Local Division 1285.
Amalgamated Transit Union. AFL-CIO-CLC. 457 U.S. 15
(1982),
These two rulings clearly show that the collective bargaining rights of transit
employees are to be governed by state law. The Court must look at state law
when determining the parameters of the collective bargaining rights of the
transit employees. The Courts have consistently stated that we look to
12
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federal labor law policy in determining whether state law meets the
minimum standards. In Donovan the DC Court of Appeals struck down the
U.S. Secretc!Lry of Labor's certification of MARTA as compliant with section
13(c) of the UMTA because Georgia law did not provide minimum
protection of labor standards.
Section 13(c) does not prescribe mandatory labor standards for
the states, but rather dictates the terms of federal mass transit
assistance. States are free to forego such assistance and thus to
adopt any collective bargaining scheme they desire; the
mandatory language of section 13(c) in no way alters this
prerogative. But the statute does not allow states to eliminate
collective bargaining rights and still enjoy federal aid.
Amalgamated Transit Union Int'! v. Donovan. 767 F.2d 939,
947 (D.C.Cir.1985).
The Donovan Court went to say:
Section 13(c)1s requirement, therefore, that labor protective
agreements provide for "the continuation of collective
bargaining rights" means, at a minimum, that where employees
enjoyed collective bargaining rights prior to public acquisition
of the transit system, they are entitled to be represented in
meaningful, "good faith" negotiations with their employer over
wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment.
Id at 951.
While the UTA seeks to rely on federal labor law, the Burke Court rejected
the concept that federal labor law predominates over state law. Burke v.
Utah Transit Authority, 462 F .3d 1253, 1260 fu2 (10th Cir.2006).

13
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The Tenth Circuit further adopted the position that federal labor
policy is the floor not the ceiling for transit labor rights. In City of Colo.
Springs v. Solis. 589 F.3d 1121, 1129 (10th Cir.2009), the Tenth Circuit

upheld the decision of the Secretary of Labor regarding a protective
agreement (Agreement) with the City of Colorado Springs. Colorado
Springs requested that the Agreement be invalidated because it exceeded the
minimum requirements under §13(c) of the UMTA.
"[t]he purpose of Section 13(c) is not ... to invalidate
overly-protective terms in a Section 13( c) agreement, but
rather 'to prevent federal funds from being used to
destroy the collective-bargaining rights of organized
workers.' "City of Colo. Springs, 587 F.Supp.2d at 1192
(quoting Jackson Transit Auth., 457 U.S. at 17, 102 S.Ct.
2202). To that end, § 13(c) establishes "minimal
standards," Burke. 462 F.3d at 1258, and does not
concern itself with-other provisions to which the parties
might agree. Citv o(Colo. Springs v. Solis, 589 F.3d
1121, 1133 (10th Cir.2009),

In order for UTA to receive federal funding, the State of Utah must have
protections in place the guarantee the transit worker organizing and
collective bargaining rights at least to the minimum federal standards. Utah
law may always exceed those minimum standards. Having established that

14
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Utah Labor Law predominates over Federal Labor Law, the Court must
examine the language of the Utah Labor Law.
a. The plain language of §17B-2a-813 U.C.A. allows the Rail
Supervisors to Organize.
Section 2 of §17B-2a-813 U.C.A. states:
(a) Employees ofa public transit system established and operated by a
public transit district have the right to:
(i) self-organization;
(ii) form, join, or assist labor organizations; and
(iii) bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing.
(b) Employees ofa public transit district and labor organizations may not
join in a strike against the public transit system operated by the public
transit district.
(c) Each public transit district shall:
(i) recogn.ize and bargain exclusively with any labor organization
representil:,,g a majority of the district's employees in an appropriate
unit with respect to wages, salaries, hours, working conditions, and
welfare, pension, and retirement provisions; and
(ii) upon reaching agreement with the labor organization, enter into
and execute a written contract incorporating the agreement.

The Public Transit District Act does not define employee. The Public
Transit District Act provides no limitations on the employees who may

15
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orgamze. The American Heritage Desk Dictionary defines "employee" as
"A person who works for another person or business in return for salary,
w~ges, or" other compensation." There is no doubt that the Rail Operations
Supervisors are employees of UTA. UTA is a Public Transit District subject
to the requirements of the Public Transit District Act. Under the plain
language of § 17B-2a-8 l 3, the Rail Operations Supervisors have the right to
organize and bargain collectively. "If the plain language is unambiguous
then we need not look beyond it, and no other interpretive tools are needed
in analyzing the statute." R & R Indus. Park. L.L. C. v. Utah Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Guar. Ass'n. 2008 UT 80,

~

23, 199 P.3d 917.

In addition 17B-2a-814 subjects every trustee, officer, and employee
of a public transit district to the Utah Public, Officers' and Employees'
Ethics Act. That act defines Public employee as "a person who is not a
public officer who is employed on a full-time, part-time, or contract basis by
the state or any of its political subdivisions. "Public employee" does not
include legislators or legislative employees." 67-16-3(12) U.C.A. Again, the
UTA supervisors meet this state law definition of employee and therefore
have the right to organize under §17B-2a-813 U.C.A.
Utah has long adopted a broad definition of employee.
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Section 42-1-41, R.S. Utah 1933, defines the words
"employee," "workman," and "operative" to mean: "(1) Every
elective and appointive officer, and every other person, in the
service of the state, or of any county, city, town or district board
of education within the state, serving the state, county, city,
town or district board of education therein under any election or
appointment, *184 or under any contract of hire, express or
implied, written or oral." Weber County-Ogden City Relief
Committee v. Industrial Commission, 93 Utah 85, 71 P.2d 177,
183-84.

Black's Law Dictionary defines the word "employee" as "[a]
person in the service of another under any contract of hire,
express or implied, oral or written, where the employer has the
power or right to control and direct the employee in the material
details of how the work is performed." Black's Law Dictionary
471 (5th ed. 1979). This definition was echoed by the Utah
Supreme Court in Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Marchant,
615 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1980), in which the court stated that
"[i]n general, it can be said that an employee is one who is hired
for compensation, for a substantial period of time, to perform
duties wherein he is subject to a comparatively high degree of
direction and control by the one who hires him." Palmer v.
Davis, 808 P.2d 128, 130 (Utah App.1991)
The state law created by Utah to govern Public Transit Employees states:
(a) Employees ofa public transit system established and operated by a
public transit district have the right to:
(i) self-organization;
(ii) form, join, or assist labor organizations; and
(iii) bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing. §l 7B-2a-813(2)(a) U.C.A.
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There are no restrictions or qualifications as to the organizing and
collective bargaining rights enjoyed by the employees. Section 17B-2a813(2)(b) does restrict the employees right to strike, demonstrating that the
Legislature could if it desired, place limitations on the rights of the
employees. It has been well established that the First Amendment protects
the right of a public employee to join and participate in a labor union. Smith
v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463,465, 99 S.Ct. 1826,
1828, 60 L.Ed.2d 360 (1979): (The public employee surely can associate and
speak freely and petition openly, and he is protected by the First Amendment
from retaliation for doing so. But the First Amendment does not impose any
affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to respond or, in this
context, to recognize the association and bargain with it.) Morfin v.
Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 906 F.2d 1434, 1438 (10th Cir.1990). 3 Normally,

3

Although similar in language, Appellee could not find any Utah case law
that upheld the right of public employees to organize under Article I Section
1 of the Utah Constitution.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances. U.S. Const. Amend. 1;
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although public employees have the right to join and participate in a union,
the public entity is under no obligation to bargain unless there is a statutory
duty. See Westly v. Board of City Comm'rs, 573 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Utah
1978) and Pratt v. CUy Council. 639 P.2d 172, 174 n. 10 (Utah 1981). In
this case, there is a statutory obligation. The Rail Operations Supervisors'
First Amendment right to join and participate in a union must be viewed in
conjunction with UTA's obligation to:
(i) recognize and bargain exclusively with any labor organization
representing a majority of the district's employees in an appropriate
unit with respect to wages, salaries, hours, working conditions, and
welfare, pension, and retirement provisions; and §17B-2a-813(c)
U.C.A.

The Rail Operations Supervisors have a right to organize and join a union.
UTA has a statutory obligation to bargain with any labor organization that
represents a majority of employees in an appropriate unit.

Article I Section 1 of the Utah Constitution states: All men have the
inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to
acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of
their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. U.C.A. Const. Art. 1,

.u
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Because the plain language of §17B-2a-813 allows employees to
organize and bargain collectively, this Court should uphold the decision of
the Trial Court.
b. State Labor Law allows the Rail Operations Supervisors to
Organize
If the Court determines that the Public Transit District Act is
ambiguous, the Court should look to the most analogous state statute for
clarity. Instead of looking to the National Labor Relations Act, the Court
should look to the Utah Labor Relations Act.
Nationally, the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively
was secured through the passage of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) in 19354, commonly known as the Wagner Act. The Wagner Act
only applied to employment affecting interstate commerce, leaving a gap
regarding employment involving intrastate commerce. Several states
enacted so-called "little Wagner Acts" to cover this gap. 5 In 193 7, Utah

4 https://VvWW.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-histmy/1935-passage-wagner-act
5 "The

Individual Employment Contract under the Wagner Act, Heinrich
Hoeninger, Fordham Law Review, 1941 page 20 footnote 26.
http://ir .lawnet. fordham. edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi? article= 1221 &context=flr
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passed the "Utah Labor Relations Act (ULRA)." 6 The ULRA definition of
"employee" mirrored the definition of "employee" in the Wagner Act.
Section 34-2-2(4)
(a)"Employee" includes any employee unless this chapter
explicitly states otherwise, and includes an individual whose
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment.
(b) "Employee" does not include an individual employed as an
agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of a family or person at
his home, or an individual employed by his parent or spouse. Utah
Code Ann.§ 34-20-2(4).
The Wagner Act defined employee as:
(3) The term " employee " shall include any employee, and
shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer,
unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not
include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in
the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any
individual employed by his parent or spouse. Defendant's
Appendix L.
This Court has previously adopted federal interpretations for sections
of the Utah Code which are identical to or copied after federal acts. W

6

The Utah Labor Relations Act is now codified as 34-2-1 et seq.
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Coating. Inc. v. Gibbons & Reed Co .• 788 P.2d 503, 505-06 {Utah 1990).

This Court has acknowledged this practice in the interpretation ofULRA.
As pointed out by defendant, the Utah act under which this
proceeding is brought was copied after the Wagner Act, 29
U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., enacted by the United States Congress.
Sections l0(c) and 1 l(f) of the Utah act (Chap. 55, Laws of
Utah 193 7) read practically verbatim as do Secs. 9(c) and I 0(f)
of the United States act, 29 U.S.C.A. 159(c) and 160(f). We,
therefore, consider the interpretation given by the federal courts
to these sections, and others which are identical. In the cases
cited, supra, and in United Employees Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 3
Cir., 96 F.2d 875, the federal courts have held that certification
by N.L.R.B. of a particular union as exclusive bargaining
representative is not a "final order" within the meaning of the
statute and, therefore, is not reviewable by the courts under Sec.
1O(f), 29 U. S.C.A. 160(£). Southeast Furniture Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 100 Utah 154, 156, 111 P.2d 153, 154
(1941);

UTA argues that the Court objective in interpreting a statute is to give
effect to the legislature's intent. The ULRA adopted practically verbatim
the definition of employee as in the Wagner Act. UTA argues that the
Congress and Utah always intended that the definition of employee did not
include supervisors. UTA's argument is based on the Congressional Record
of the Taft-Hartley Amendments and the dissent of Justice Douglas in
Packard Motor Car Company v. National Labor Relations Board. 330 U.S.
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485 (1947). The Court should reject UTA's attempt to re-litigate this issue
through dubious legislative history and minority opinions.
UTA uses the dissent from the Packard case to justify their position.
UTA ignores the majority opinion in that case. After examining the
language of the Wagner Act, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that there
"is no more reason to conclude that the law prohibits foremen as a class
from constituting an appropriate bargaining unit than there is for concluding
that they are not within the Act at all." Packard Motor Car Company v. NL.

R. B., 330 U.S. 491 (1947)(superceded by statute). The Packard Court then
went on the explicitly reject the approach offered by the UTA.
We are invited to make a lengthy examination of views
expressed in Congress while this and later legislation was
pending to show that exclusion of foremen was intended. There
is, however, no ambiguity in this Act to be clarified by resort to
legislative history, either of the Act itself or of subsequent
legislative proposals which failed to become law.
Id at 492.
The idea that supervisors were protected under the Wagner Act was not new
to our federal courts. Six years prior to Packard, the Eight Circuit came to
the same conclusion.

National Labor Relations Board v. Skinner &

Kennedy Stationery Co., 113 F. (2d) 667,670 (1940).
It is first argued that Eckert is not an employee within the
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meaning of the Act. The contention is that being a foreman he
is an employer and not an employee. Section 2(2) of the Act is
relied upon wherein an 'employer' is defined to include 'any
person acting in the interest of an employer.' Section 2(3) of the
Act is ignored. It provides that 'The term 'employee' shall
include any employee.' There is no inconsistency in these
provisions when facts ~e taken into consideration. A foreman,
in his relation to his employer, is an employee, while in his
relation to the laborers under him he is the representative of the
employer and within the definition of section 2(2) of the Act.
Nothing in the Act excepts foremen from its benefits nor from
protection against discrimination nor unfair labor practices of
the master. Id at 670-71, see also American Steel"Founders v.
Nat. Labor Relations Board, 7 Cir., 158 F.2d 896, 898, (The
statute defining an 'employee' is broad enough to cover every
type of personnel, supervisory or otherwise. The statute does
not limit the term. We know of no case, and none has been
cited, where it has been held that supervisory persoooel are not
employees within the meaning of the Act and not entitled to all
of the benefits therein conferred upon an employee.)
As the Seventh Circuit note, there is no limit on the term employee.
The definition under Section 34-2-2(4) contains specific restrictive language
that restricts any limits on the term "Employee". (a)"Employee" includes
any employee unless this chapter explicitly states otherwise ... " Utah Code
Ann. § 34-20-2(4). Even after the passage of the Taft Hartley amendments,
the Supreme Court acknowledged the appropriateness of the expansive
definition of employees under the Wagner Act. NLRB v. Town & Country
Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 91-92 116 S.Ct. 450, 133 L.Ed.2d 371 O995)(A
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broad, literal reading of the statute is consistent with cases in this Court ...
where the Court wrote that the breadth of§ 2(3 )' s definition is striking: the
Act squarely applies to any employee.) (also acknowledging that the Taft
Hartley Amendments overruled Packard)

c. Federal Labor law in 1964 does not control
There is nothing in that statutory section which confines the
employees' rights to those that were defined in 1964 under the NLRA as
asserted by UTA. UTA Memorandum page 15. The Court should reject this
argument because UTA never made this argument before the Trial Court.
"We will not address any new arguments raised for the first time on appeal."
Treff v. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50,, 9 n. 4, 26 P.3d 212. UTA's position would

lead to absurd results. As federal labor law evolved, the rights of UTA
employees would remain stagnant. The Weingarten rights established by the
NLRB and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court would have no application
under UTA's theory. National Labor Relations Board v. J Weingarten, Inc.,
420 U.S. 251, 95 S.Ct. 959, 43 L.Ed.2d 171 (1974)(right to have a union
representative present during an investigatory interview). Labor relations for
Public Transit Employees would be stuck in time. There is no indication
that Congress ever intend such a result. In addition, UTA's argument relies
25
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on the Court following federal labor law. As shown above, the courts had
clearly stated that state law, not federal law controls the rights of the
employees in this case.
d. Taft Hartley did not clarify the Wagner Act
The Court should reject UTA's argument that the Taft Hartley
amendments clarified the Wagner Act. The Trial Court correctly rejected
UTA's argument. Before resorting to legislative history, a Court must find
the statutory language ambiguous. Taylor ex rel. C. T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT

35,, 13, 977 P.2d 479. The Trial Court acknowledged that the language in
the Wagner Act was found to be unambiguous by the U.S. Supreme Court:

"If the United States Supreme Court hold that a particular
passage is unambiguous, then that is the end of the matter. A
judicial determination that a passage is unambiguous means, by
definition, that there are not two reasonable interpretations of
that passage. If Congress take another view, then its original
interpretation was, ipso facto, not reasonable. Congress may
certainly disagree with the Court's interpretation of the statute,
and may even amend the statute, but none of the legislative
action chages the fact that the passage was originally
unambiguous, and it is unambiguous because the Supreme
Court says it is."(01014)
The Supreme Court ruled the definition of employees in the Wagner
Act to be unambiguous. The ULRA Utah Code Ann. § 34-20-2( 4)
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tracks that same unambiguous language. The Court should reject
UTA' s attempts to rewrite the language with subsequent legislation.
Nothing in the actual language of the Taft Hartley amendments
indicate that it was intended to clarify the Wagner Act. Absent some
language in the statute, the Court should reject UTA's assertion. Salt Lake
County v. Holliday "fVater Co .• 2010 UT 45, ,r 44,234 P.3d 1105. The

language in the Taft Hartley Amendments contradicts UTA's argument. "To
amend the National Labor Relations Act, to provide additional facilities for
the mediation of labor disputes affecting commerce, to equalize legal
responsibilities of labor organizations and employers and for other
purposes." UTA Appendix P. The language states the purpose is to amend,
not clarify.
UTA provides legislative history from the Taft Hartley amendments
to support their contention, however they decline to provide the history from
the Wagner Act. This Court has consistently offered admonishments on
relying on legislative history when there is no ambiguity. "However, it is
elementary that we do not seek guidance from legislative history and
relevant policy considerations when the statute is clear and unambiguous."
Tavlor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ,r 13, 977 P.2d 479. The U.S.
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Supreme Court found no ambiguity in the Wagner Act language defining
employees. Utah's Little Wagner Act contains the exact same language.
There is no ambiguity that needs interpretation.
The Wagner Act was passed in 1935. Almost immediately, the NLRB
permitted those in a supervisory role to organize. In the Matter of

International Mercantile Marine Company and its subsidiaries and
affiliates: American Merchant Line, Panama Pacific Line and United States
Lines and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 3, Case
No. R. 24, decided March 21, 1936 (1 N. L. R. B. 384) (chief engineers
could be included in the bargaining unit.). As noted above, the Federal
Appellate Courts also had no problem protecting supervisors under the
NLRA. National Labor Relations Board v. Skinner & Kennedy Stationery
Co., 113 F. (2d) 667,670 0940). Despite Board and Court decisions that
clearly established the rights of supervisors, Congress waited until 1947 to
alter the definition of "employees". What prompted Congress to change the
definition of "employee" wasn't the Supreme Court's decision in Packard,
rather it was the election of 1946 which resulted in the Democratic Party
losing control of Congress for the first time in 16 years.
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UTA's use of subsequent legislation has also been rejected by the
Utah Supreme Court. "The fact that the legislature felt that this change was
necessary, however, provides no support for reading the plain language of
· the statute as it existed prior to 1996 to make this amendment superfluous.
Later versions of a statute do not necessarily reveal the intent behind an
earlier version." Visitor Info. Ctr. Auth. v. Customer Serv. Div.• Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997) Although UTA argues that
the Taft-Hartley amendments sought to clarify the definition of employee,
again this approach is highly suspect. As the Utah Supreme Court noted,
clarifying amendments usually "supports the proposition that the statute
previously meant something different from what it now says." Id.
UTA attempts to "clarify" the definition of employee also fails to
account for the fact that Congress specifically changed the definition of
employee with the Taft-Hartley Amendments, yet Utah did not seek the
same clarification. Utah was fully aware of these changes but declined to
follow suit. (00237). Knowing that the definition of employee under the
Wagner Act included supervisors, the Utah Legislature declined to provide a
"clarifying" amendment such as Congress did with the Taft-Hartley
Amendments. This is a strong indication that the Utah Legislature intended
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to maintain the definition of employee as original designed in the Wagner
Act.
After the Trial Court issued its ruling, UTA sought to "clarify"
employees under the Public Transit Act by excluding supervisors. (See
Appendix Exhibit 1). Despite extensive lobbying by UTA, the Utah
Legislature declined to approve the amendment proposed by UTA.
Despite some local pressure in 1947 to revisit Utah's "little Wagner
Act", no substantial changes were made to the definition of "employee".
Altho~gh the Utah Legislature recodified ULRA, the current definition of
"employee" remains substantially the same as the 193 7 version. Unlike
Congress with the NLRA, the Utah Legislature never took action to exclude
supervisors from the definition of employees who are eligible to organize
after the passage of Utah's little Wagner Act. Even if UTA is able to
demonstrate that the Rail Operations Supervisors are "supervisors" within
the concepts of the NLRA, they are nonetheless eligible to organize under
Utah law. If public policy dictates that "supervisors" should be excluded
from the ability to organize, it is the Utah Legislature that must take the
political step to exclude them, not the Utah courts. As the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
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[I]t should be borne in mind that there is a definite distinction
between a change in interpretation or application of a statute,
which sometimes quite justifiably occurs, and attempting by
judicial fiat to affect a substantial change in law as clearly
expressed in a statute or the constitution. \¥hen such a
substantial change is necessary or desirable, our constitution
has set up procedures for the change by the legislature, or of the
constitution, by the amendment process. Shelmidine v. Jones,
550 P.2d 207, 210-1 (Utah 1976)

It is clear under existing Utah law that supervisors within the
jurisdiction of Utah Labor law have the right to organize. The Court
should apply that principal to this case and uphold the ruling of the
Trial Court.
There is nothing new in this argument. It is rooted in the
misconception that because the employer has the right to
wholehearted loyalty in the performance of the contract of
employment, the employee does not have the right to protect his
independent and adverse interest in the terms of the contract
itself and the conditions of work. But the effect of the National
Labor Relations Act is otherwise, and it is for Congress, not for
us, to create exceptions or qualifications at odds with its plain
terms. Packard Motor Car Company v. N. L. R. B" 330 U. S.
485 (1947)(superceded by statute).
This Court has the same challenged faced by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Whether you agree or disagree with the policy of letting supervisors
organize, you remain bound by the statutory language drafted by the
legislature. The definition of employee in ULRA, like the Wagner Act,
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contains no qualifying language to exclude supervisors. If that change needs
to be made, it is for the legislature to make that change.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The Court should decline to rule on this matter because the issues
raised by UTA are moot. The Court should affirm the decision of the Trial
Court. The Trial Court correctly held that under Utah labor law, Rail
Operations Supervisors have the right to organize and bargain collectively.
The plain language of §17B-2a-813 U.C.A. supports the Trial Court's
decision. Utah labor law, as currently written, supports the Trial Court's
position. Any change in the law should come from the legislature, not the
Court.
Dated: November 1, 2017.

~
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S.B. 176

1

PUBLIC TRANSIT AUTHORITY COLLECTIVE

2

BARGAINING AMENDMENTS

3

2017 GENERAL SESSION

4

STATE OF UTAH

5

Chief Sponsor: Todd Weiler

6

House Sponsor: _ _ _ _ __

7
8

LONGTITLE

9

General Description:

10

This bill amends·provisions related to collective bargaining by public transit district

11

employees.

12

Highlighted Provisions:

13

This bill:

14

•

defines terms;

15

•

excludes "professional employees 11 and "supervisors" from the definition of

16

"employee";

17
18

•

group of employees;

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

provides a method for certification of a labor organization to bargain on behalf of a

•

provides minimum intervals between votes for certification of a labor organization;

•

makes technical changes.

and

Money Appropriated in this Bill:

None
Other Special Clauses:

None
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Utah Code Sections Affected:
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28

17B-2a-802, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2016, Chapter 387

29

17B-2a-813, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2013, Chapter 448

30

3l

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

32

Section 1. Section 17B-2a-802 is amended to read:

33

17B-2a-802. Definitions.

34

As used in this part:

35

(1).@} "Affordable housing" means housing occupied or reserved for occupancy by

36

households that meet certain gross household income requirements based on the area median

37

income for households of the same size.

38

[W] ili} "Affordable housing" may include housing occupied or reserved for

39

occupancy by households that meet specific area median income targets or ranges of area

40

median income targets.

41

[tbJ] .{Q} "Affordable housing" does not include housing occupied or reserved for

42

occupancy by households with gross household incomes that are more than 60% of the area

43

median income for households of the same size.

44
45
46
47
48

(2) "Appointing entity" mearis the person, county, unincorporated area of a county, or
municipality appointing a member to a public transit district board of trustees.

(3) (a) "Chief executive officer" means [a pet son] an individual appointed by the board
of trustees to serve as chief executive officer.
(b) "Chief executive officer" shall enjoy all the rights, duties, and responsibilities

49

defined in Sections 17B-2a-8 l 0 and 17B-2a-8 l l and includes all rights, duties, and

50

responsibilities assigned to the general manager but prescribed by the board of trustees to be

51

fulfilled by the chief executive officer.

52

(4) "Department" means the Department of Transportation created in Section 72-1-201.

53

(5) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(b), "employee" means an individual

54
55
56
57
58

employed by a public transit district.
(b) "Employee" does not include an independent contractor, a professional employee,
or a supervisor.

[ts,] {fil (a) "General manager 11 means [a pe1son] an individual appointed by the board
of trustees to serve as general manager.
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(b) "General manager" shall enjoy all the rights, duties, and responsibilities defined in

59
60

Sections 17B-2a-810 and 17B-2a-8l l prescribed by the board of trustees.

[t67] ill (a) "Locally elected public official" means [a person] an individual who holds

61
62

an elected position with a county or municipality.

(b) "Locally elected public official" does not include [a person] an individual who

63
64

holds an elected position if the elected position is not with a county or municipality.

[ffj] ill "Metropolitan planning organization" means the same as that tennis defined

65
66

in Section 72-1-208.5.
[t8J] {22 "Multi county district" means a public transit district located in more than one

67
68

69
70
71

72
73
74

S.B. 176

county.

[t97] Q_Q} "Operator" means a public entity or other person engaged in the
transportation of passengers for hire.
(11) "Professional employee" means the same as that term is defined in 29 U.S.C.
Sec.152.

[ti-07] .Lll} "Public transit" means the transportation of passengers only and their
incidental baggage by means other than:

75

(a) chartered bus;

76

(b) sightseeing bus; or

77

(c) taxi.

78

(13) "Supervisor" means the same as that tennis defined in 29 U.S.C. Sec.152.

79

[EH}] .Ll..1}. "Transit facility" means a transit vehicle, transit station, depot, passenger

80

loading or unloading zone, parking lot, or other facility:

81

(a) leased by or operated by or on behalf of a public transit district; and

82

(b) related to the public transit services provided by the district, including:

83

(i) railway or other right-of-way;

84

(ii) railway line; and

85

(iii) a reasonable area immediately adjacent to a designated stop on a route traveled by

86
87

a transit vehicle.

[(tz}] .Ll.i} "Transit-oriented development" means a mixed use residential or

88

commercial area that is designed to maximize access to public transit and includes the

89

development of land owned by a public transit district that serves a county of the first class.
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90

[ft:37] ..Ll.fil "Transit-supportive development" means a mixed use residential or

91

commercial area that is designed to maximize access to public transit and does not include the

92

development of land owned by a public transit district.
[fi-47]

93

il.12

"Transit vehicle" means a passenger bus, coach, railcar, van, or other

94

vehicle operated as public transportation by a public transit district.

95

Section 2. Section 17B-2a-813 is amended to read:

96

17B-2a-813. Rights, benefits, and protective conditions for employees of a public

97

transit district - Strike prohibited -- Employees of an acquired transit system.

98

(1) The rights, benefits, and other employee protective conditions and remedies of

99

Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5333(b), as

100

detennined by the Secretary of Labor, apply to a public transit district's establishment and

101

operation of a public transit service or system.
(2) (a) Employees of a public transit system established and operated by a public transit

102
103

district have the right to:

104

(i) self-organization;

105

(ii) form, join, or assist labor organizations; [and]

106

(iii) bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing[':']; or

107

(iv) refrain from any or all of the above.

108

(b) Employees of a public transit district and labor organizations may not join in a

109

strike against the public transit system operated by the public transit district.

110

( c) Each public transit district shall:

111

(i) recognize and bargain exclusively with any labor organization [1cp1esenting]

112

authorized to represent a majority of the district's employees in an appropriate unit with respect

113

to wages, salaries, hours, working conditions, and welfare, pension, and retirement provisions;

114

and

115
116
117

(ii) upon reaching agreement with the labor organization as described in Subsection
(2)( c)(i), enter into and execute a written contract incorporating the agreement.
(3) For recognition and bargaining authority as described in Subsection (2)(c), a public

118

transit district shall recognize a labor organization acting on behalf of a bargaining unit if the

119

labor organization:

120

(a) presents a petition to the public transit district in which 30% of employees in the
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bargaining unit allege their desire to be represented by a labor organization; and

122

(b) obtains a majority vote in favor of having the labor organization act as the

123

bargaining unit representative in a secret ballot election among the employees in the bargaining

124

unit.

125
126

(4) Subsection (3) shall not apply to labor organizations with collective bargaining
agreements in effect before January 1, 2017.

127

(5) (a) The election described in Subsection (3)(b) shall be overseen by:

128

(i) a third party selected by agreement between the labor organization and the public

129

transit district; or

130

(ii) in the absence of an agreement, by the Utah Labor Commission.

131

(b) Elections held pursuant to Subsection (3 )(b) may be conducted at the intervals

132

prescribed in 29 U.S.C. Sec. 159(c)(3).

133

[ffl] _(fil If a public transit district acquires an existing public transit system:

134

(a) all employees of the acquired system who are necessary for the operation of the

135

acquired system, except executive and administrative officers and employees, shall be:

136

(i) transferred to and appointed employees of the acquiring public transit district; and

13 7

(ii) given sick leave, seniority, vacation, and pension or retirement credits in

138
139

accordance with the acquired system's records;
(b) members and beneficiaries of a pension or retirement plan or other program of

140

benefits that the acquired system has established shall continue to have rights, privileges,

141

benefits, obligations, and status with respect to that established plan or program; and

142

(c) the public transit district may establish, amend, or modify, by agreement with

143

employees or their authorized representatives, the terms, conditions, and provisions of a

144

pension or retirement plan or of an amendment or modification of a pension or retirement plan.

145

[t4}] ill A pension administrator for a retirement plan sponsored by a public transit

146

district or a person designated by the administrator shall maintain retirement records in

147

accordance with Subsection 49-11-618(2).
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